McConnell Links Nick and Miriam Clegg to Free Flight Decoy 9/11

The Abel Danger White House Group announced today that it has linked Nick and Miriam Clegg to an EU-funded development of a Federal Bridge Certification Authority for the Free Flight decoy maneuvers on 9/11.

Abel Danger Global Operations Director, Field McConnell, claims that the two Cleggs extorted Leon Britain, the then European Commissioner for Trade, into funding the development of Free Flight 9/11 capability in Europe while they decoyed agents of the United States CTC (CIA Counterterrorism Center) with false-flag Muslim groups, such as the ephemeral al-Qaeda cells, identified by General Henry Shelton’s “Able Danger” data mining program.

“The Cleggs – ELECTION SONG CONTEST 2010”

McConnell will show other presidential candidates how to recognize the Cleggs’ use of the Federal Bridge Certification Authority for the Free Flight decoy maneuvers of 9/11

“The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency‘s Counterterrorism Center was established in 1986, and is a division of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. It is not to be confused with the National Counterterrorism Center, which is a separate entity. In the early 1990s, the CTC had no more than a hundred personnel, divided into about a dozen branches. Besides branches specializing in Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and secular groups like the Japanese Red Army, another concentrated on Sunni Islamist radicalism, primarily in Algeria. In January 1996, the CTC opened the Bin Laden Issue Station to track Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, with Michael Scheuer, formerly in charge of the CTC’s Islamic Extremist Branch, as its first head .. Paul Pillar became chief of analysis in 1993, and by 1997, he was the Center’s deputy director. But in summer 1999 he suffered a clash of styles with Cofer Black. Soon after, Pillar left the CTC. He was replaced as deputy director by Ben Bonk. Henry Crumpton was head of operations in the late 1990s, and came back after 9/11 as chief of a new Special Operations section. In the late 1990s, the CIA began to set up Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers, in collaboration with the intelligence services of individual countries to deal with Islamist militants. The CTICs spread widely after the September 11, 2001 attacks, existing in more than two dozen countries by 2005. Officers from the host nations serving in the CTICs were vetted by the CIA, and usually supervised by the local CIA chief of station. “The Plan”, 1999–2001


In December 1998 CIA chief George Tenet “declared war” on Osama bin Laden. Early in 1999 Tenet he ordered the CTC to conduct a review of the CIA’s operational strategy, with the aim of creating ‘a new, comprehensive plan of attack’ against al-Qaeda. By mid-September, the result of this review, known simply as “The Plan”, had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, and to the NSA, the FBI, and other partners. Once Cofer Black had finalized his operational plan, Charles Allen, associate deputy director of Central Intelligence for Collection, created a dedicated al-Qaeda cell with officers from across the intelligence community. This cell met daily, focusing on penetrating the Afghan sanctuary, and ensuring that collection initiatives were synchronized with operational plans. Allen met with Tenet on a weekly basis to review initiatives. The CIA increasingly concentrated its diminished resources on counterterrorism, so that resources for this activity increased sharply, in contrast to the general trend. At least some of the Plan’s more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. The core 9/11 hijackers emerge Beginning in September 1999, the CTC picked up multiple signs that bin Laden had set in motion major terrorist attacks for the turn of the year. The CIA set in motion what Black later described as the “largest collection and disruption activity in the history of mankind”. They focused on known al-Qaeda terrorists, and on senior personnel both inside and outside Afghanistan. Amid this activity, in November–December 1999 Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected by al-Qaeda for the 9/11 operation. In late 1999, the NSA picked up traces of an “operational cadre” consisting of al-Hazmi, his younger brother Salem, and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who were planning to go to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in January 2000. A CTC officer sought permission to conduct surveillance on the men. At about this time the SOCOMDIA data mining operation “Able Danger” also identified a potential al-Qaeda unit, consisting of the future leading 9/11 hijackers, and termed them the “Brooklyn cell”. Altogether, the operation found five cells, including two of the three cells involved in the 9/11 attack. The CIA erratically tracked al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar as they traveled to and attended the al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur in early January 2000. .. The Predator drone, 2000–2001 In autumn 2000, a series of flights over Afghanistan by Predator drones, under the joint control of the USAF and the CTC, produced probable sightings of bin Laden. CTC Director Black advocated arming Predators with missiles to try to launch a targeted killing of bin Laden, but there were legal and technical issues: under the new Bush administration in 2001, Black continued to lobby for Predators armed with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles. On Black’s advice, Tenet raised the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001, and received authorisation to deploy the system.”

“The CTC did not analyze how a hijacked aircraft or other explosives-laden aircraft might be used as a weapon. If it had done so, it could have identified that a critical obstacle would be to find a suicide terrorist able to fly large jet aircraft. This had never happened before 9/11.

The CTC did not develop a set of tell-tale indicators for this means of attack. For example, one such indicator might be the discovery of terrorists seeking or taking flight training to fly large jet aircraft, or seeking to buy advanced flight simulators.

The CTC did not propose, and the intelligence community collection management process did not set, collection requirements against such tell-tale indicators. Therefore, the warning system was not looking for information such as the July 2001 FBI report of terrorist interest in various kinds of aircraft training in Arizona, or the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui because of his suspicious behavior in a Minnesota flight school. In late August, the Moussaoui arrest was briefed to the DCI and other top CIA officials under the heading, quote, “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly,” close quote. The news had no evident effect on warning.

Neither the intelligence community nor the NSC policy process analyzed systemic defenses of aircraft or against suicide aircraft. The many threat reports mentioning aircraft were passed to the FAA. We discussed the problems at that agency in Staff Statements 3 and 4.”

“[Mrs. Clegg] is a qualified Spanish lawyer. She has been senior adviser to two EU Commissioners and a senior policy adviser to the UK presidency of the EU whilst at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.” .. “Acted as a lead negotiator at the WTO negotiations on telecom services and on international aspects of electronic commerce for EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan [When she developed Federal Bridge Certification Authority with root key held by UK MoD acting ultra vires for Star Chamber extortionists on the Privy Council] . During this time she secured agreement on telecoms trade liberalisation (worth US$600bn in 1997) as well as agreement on groundbreaking regulatory provisions … Led and managed the EU negotiating teams for services and investment aspects of free trade in services in both the multilateral negotiations and the bilateral accession negotiations of [Free Flight 9/11 decoy sponsor] Saudi Arabia (notably in relation to dual pricing for energy) and China.”

“In April 1994, [Nick Clegg] took up a post at the European Commission, working in the TACIS aid programme to the former Soviet Union. For two years he was responsible for developing direct aid programmes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, worth €50 million. He was involved in negotiations with Russia on airline overflight rights, and launched a conference in Tashkent in 1993 that founded TRACECA—an international transport programme for the development of a Transport Corridor for Europe, the Caucasus and Asia [When he developed the Free Flight decoy maneuvers with time-lapse root key held by UK MoD acting ultra vires for Star Chamber extortionists on the Privy Council]. Vice President and Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan then offered Clegg a job in his private office, as a European Union policy adviser and speech writer. As part of this role, Clegg was in charge of the EC negotiating team on Chinese and Russian accession talks to the World Trade Organisation.

“He was knighted in 1989. He was made European Commissioner for Competition at the European Commission early in 1989, resigning as an MP to take the position. In 1995 he became European Commissioner for Trade and European Commissioner for External Affairs, also serving as Vice-President of the European Commission. Brittan resigned with the rest of the commission in 1999 amid accusations of fraud. During his time as Vice President of the European Commission, one subsequently prominent member of his official office was Nick Clegg, currently leader of the Liberal Democrats and Deputy Prime Minister [who allegedly master-minded the frauds with his future Missus]”

Please visit links to see why Field McConnell has launched a PresidentialField election campaign to, inter alia, dismantle the Cleggs’ EU Federal Bridge Certification Authority and punish them and those who conspired with them in the Free Flight attacks of 9/11.

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