Plum City – (AbelDanger.net): United States Marine Field McConnell has linked Serco’s Black Hand* OOOI murder-for-hire network, allegedly based out of a drug hub at RAF Northolt, to HSBC’s NetJets student-loan scheme and the transport of crews for production of snuff films attributed to Mohammed Emwazi aka Jihadi John – erstwhile resident of a ground-floor council flat on the edge of the Mozart Estate, north of the Harrow Road in West London.
“OOOI Data refers to times of the actual aircraft movements of Gate Out, Wheels Off, Wheels On, and Gate In. This data is provided for many carriers on a next day basis from ARINC, a private aviation communications company, and on a monthly basis from DOT’s ASQP Data. In addition, starting October 1, 2012, CountOps Threshold Crossing Times, which are within seconds of the Wheels Off and Wheels On times, are used to populate the Wheels Off and Wheels On times on a next day basis when no ARINC OOOI data are available. CountOps is an automated source of departure and arrival counts for Operations Network (OPSNET). [Allegedly synchronized by HSBC to DoJ Joint Automated Booking System JABS]”
Black Hand* – Drug-hub navigators with a Privy Seal License to Track, Film, Kill, Bribe” for the City of London’s Honourable Artillery Company 1537; The Master Mariners and Air Pilots (formerly GAPAN) 1929, and The Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Massachusetts 1638 – whose alumni include the United States’ Presidents James Monroe, Chester Alan Arthur, Calvin Coolidge and John F. Kennedy and – perhaps – Barack ‘Choom Gang’ Obama.
McConnell alleges that Serco uses Black Hand OOOI times to synchronize Jihadi John snuff films for use by HSBC drug-hub operatives in the extortion of fractional owners of NetJets.
McConnell alleges that Serco uses Black Hand OOOI times to synchronize the Naudet Brothers (Naudets/Duane St) film of AA Flight 11 being navigated into the North tower of the World Trade Center at 08:46:40 for “the first live-broadcast mass snuff film in human history” on 9/11.
McConnell is attend The British Constitution Group’s Spring Conference, held jointly with the UK Column, in Telford, U.K., starting February 28, where he will invite rebuttal of his allegation that Serco is using a Black Hand OOOI network out of an HSBC drug hub at RAF Northolt to track production crews for the snuff films attributed to Mohammed Emwazi aka Jihadi John.
SWISSLEAKS – “HSBC developed dangerous clients: arms merchants, drug dealers, terrorism financers”
Copy of SERCO GROUP PLC: List of Subsidiaries AND Shareholders! (Mobile Playback Version) [Note that HSBC is Serco’s banker and one of Serco’s major shareholders with
Her Majesty’s Government and its funds]
Serco… Would you like to know more?
“Jihadi John: From ordinary schoolboy to world’s most wanted man
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about ‘Jihadi John’, the world’s most wanted man, is just how ordinary he actually is.
‘Jihadi John’ – the barbaric executioner of Western hostages held in Syria – has been unmasked as a computer studies graduate who grew up in a leafy and affluent suburb of west London.
His real name is Mohammed Emwazi, the eldest of six children, who took pride in his appearance, wore nice clothes, and appears – on the face of it at least – to have been a diligent student. He doesn’t even have a criminal record.
Nevertheless over the course of six years following his graduation, Emwazi undertook a journey that transformed him from benign teenager to the most demonic of killers, a blood-thirsty murderer who beheaded hostages, including Britons David Haines and Alan Henning, broadcast to the world in propaganda videos for the Islamic State.
The early years
Mohammed Emwazi, now 26, was born in Kuwait in 1988. His parents Jasem, 51, and Ghaneya, 47, came to London in 1993 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. Mohammed Emwazi was just six and he arrived in the UK with his parents and a younger sister Asma, now a young architect with a bright future ahead of her. Four more siblings would be born in the UK. Emwazi is an unusual surname – it is the only one listed in the UK – and transliterated from the Arabic al-Muazzem or al-Muazzam. At one stage, many years later in 2010, Emwazi would be referred to as al-Muazzam in a report that would give a hint to the terrorist path on which he was about to embark.
But during those early years, the family were happily ensconced in west London, in an area bordering David Cameron’s famously wealthy and influential ‘Notting Hill’ set. Jasem runs a taxi firm while Ghaneya brought up the children. The family moved a fair bit, Emwazi undergoing something of a peripatetic upbringing, repeatedly swapping one rented property for another in the Maida Vale area, one of the most expensive areas in the country.
Between 1996 and 1997, the family lived in a three-bedroomed, first floor flat sandwiched between the Regents Park canal and the A40 overlooking the busy Marybelone flyover. Flats there currently sell for up to £800,000.
From that flat in Warwick Cresecent they moved to nearby Desborough Close, a modern and run-down terrace surrounded by council blocks.
Emwazi lived with his family at this small house for four years until 2002. Neighbours either did not know them or were reluctant to talk. One, who did not want to be identified, said she was friends with his sister and that they were a lovely, quiet family.
The schoolboy footballer
By now the Emwazi children were beginning to enrol in the local secondary Quintin Kynaston, a popular and successful academy. The school yesterday refused to confirm if Mohammed Emwazi had attended the school with a spokesman declining to comment but postings on the internet show his siblings certainly went there and did well. Asra was a prefect and won a £200 prize for looking after the school farm. Mohammed Emwazi, now a teenager, seemed to have no gripe with his life growing up in the West.
One schoolfriend from Quintin Kynaston, speaking anonymously because he feared just knowing Jihadi John would damage his career, said Emwazi was a “typical north-west London boy”.
The friend went on: “He seemed like a nice guy. He seemed confident in the way he carried himself but didn’t really show himself off. He seemed like a down-to-earth person and humble. He liked football and he was friends with everyone. All the Indian boys, all the Pakistani boys, people from different religions, he spoke to everyone. I don’t think he was particularly religious at the time.”
One of Emwazi’s former teachers said: “He was a diligent hard working lovely young man, responsible, quiet. He was everything you could want a student to be.
“I’m just absolutely shocked that appears to be him. It’s just a 100 miles away from where I thought he’d be. It makes you wonder what can happen in the years when you don’t see these young people. It’s really scary. He was religious and I think as he got older he did become more devout. He would go the mosque and pray, but then a lot of the kids did that.
“He was somebody who would always seek the correct way of handling something. There was never any indication of any violence at all.”
During Emwazi’s time at secondary school the family moved again, this time to a modern apartment block close to lords cricket ground, staying there until 2005. The block is rundown, and largely owned by the local authority. One neighbour said she remembered the Emwazis as a family that “were certainly not particularly friendly or chatty and kept themselves to themselves”.
They pitched up next in a much more desirable spot, an Edwardian mansion block called Blomfield House, where a flat recently sold for £1.2 million. Residents yesterday spoke of their shock and astonishment that ‘Jihadi John’ was until 2008 their neighbour.
University and the path to radicalisation
Emwazi did well enough at his A-Levels to gain a place on the computer programming course at the University of Westminster in 2006. The university has, along with other further education institutions, faced questions about the links between its student union and extremists. In 2011, for example, a student connected to the radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir was elected as president of the University of Westminster’s union. Security services will have been looking at any possibility that Emwazi became radicalised while at college. Yesterday, the university issued a statement appalled at its new association with ‘Jihadi John’.
“A Mohammed Emwazi left the University six years ago,” said a spokesman, “If these allegations are true, we are shocked and sickened by the news. Our thoughts are with the victims and their families.” The university went on to announce the establishment “of a dedicated pastoral team to provide advice and support” as a consequence of the disclosure.
Emwazi, although by now devout, has insisted he was never a radical at this time; he denied being sucked in to a world of extremism. The Washington Post has claimed he was an occasional worshipper at a mosque in Greenwich although yesterday nobody there – perhaps not surprisingly – could recall ever seeing him. Graduating in his early 20s, he is described by those who knew him as a “polite” young man with a “penchant for wearing stylish western clothes” while at the same time “adhering to the tenets of his Islamic faith”. He had grown a beard and was “mindful of making eye contact with women”. Everything appears to have changed – at least according to one version of events – with a post graduation trip to Tanzania, planned with two friends, one an unnamed German convert student called Omar and another known only as Abu Talib, neither of whose real identity has been disclosed. Emwazi would later insist it was just three chums heading for a safari in east Africa; intelligence agencies in the UK were convinced their plan was altogether more sinister.
The flight to Tanzania
In August 2009, Emwazi, his degree completed, boarded a flight for Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian capital, with his “two close friends from childhood”. They never made it to their safari if that had really been their intention. Instead at the airport on landing the trio were met by border control officers who denied them entry to the country. The young men were put in waiting cars and driven to the nearest police station to the airport and thrown in a cell where they were held for 24 hours, a gun at one point pointed at the startled Emwazi.
A Tanzanian immigration officer who worked at the international airport recalled the incident. “They arrived on KLM from Amsterdam and we had been told by our international security partners that they should be questioned closely,” the man told The Telegraph, refusing to be named and refusing to confirm that the order to stop the three came from British intelligence.
“I was on shift but I was not directly involved. Other senior men did it. They stopped them, the German and the British, and took them for questioning. They were supposed to be put back on the very same aircraft to return that night, but in detaining them, our officers missed the boat and the flight left.
“We hosted them until the next flight in a secure facility.”
Sources said the men were kept at Stakishari Prison, known for its brutal conditions.
Put back on a plane the next day, the men were escorted to a flight to Schipol, Holland’s main airport and a major hub for its national airline KLM.
Detention in Amsterdam and the return to the UK
For what happened next at Schipol airport, there is only Emwazi’s word for it. He claims to have been met off the plane at Amsterdam by four armed men in a detailed version of events he gave to Cage, a controversial human rights group that campaigns for Muslim prisoners, in protest at his own detention. According to Emwazi, he was locked in a room and interrogated by an MI5 agent he knew only as ‘Nick’, who accused him of being a terrorist planning to join the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab in Somalia. Emwazi denied the claims strenuously, insisting he had only been a tourist heading for safari. The extracts, as Emwazi relates them, offers snippets of a young man, still only 21, who denies being an extremist or dangerous but clearly bright and not afraid to stand up to his interrogators. By the interview’s conclusion, the MI5 officers had offered to recruit Emwazi. The trio – they had been separately questioned – were then taken out of the airport and driven to the ferry terminal and back to the UK.
In Dover, anti-terrorism officers were again waiting for him. The questioning was similar. The officers asked him about his views on 7/7 and 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. Emwazi told Cage: “I said, ‘What do I think? We see innocent people being killed in news daily’.”
Officers even asked him about his view of Jews: “Then he asked me of my opinion about Jews, just he had asked others. I told him that it was their religion and every one had a right to have his own belief.” If Emwazi was harbouring extremist views at this point, he was belligerent in his denials. He even managed to slip in his interest in fashion, in part as a rebuttal to claims he had with him a camouflage combat jacket. Emwazi insisted the jacket was only for taking on safari.
“I started laughing and asked how he could even suggest that it was military, what he was trying to prove. I had another jumper, a stylish Rocawear jumper, so I asked him what about this jumper. Was he not going to make any comment about that? He fell silent then,” he recalled in his Cage testimony.
But what really stung Emwazi was the realisation that while he had been in Tanzania, MI5 had visited his parents – who had known nothing of his ‘holiday’ – but had also approached his fiancee, a girl in Kuwait, to whom he had been introduced through his family.
According to Asim Qureshi, research director at Cage, Emwazi subsequently visited him to complain about his treatment. “Mohammed was quite incensed by his treatment, that he had been very unfairly treated,” wrote Mr Qureshi. Shown video footage of ‘Jihadi John’, Mr Qureshi concluded there was an “extremely strong resemblance” between Emwazi, and Jihadi John.
Trips back to Kuwait
Spooked by the spooks and, on the advice of his parents, Emwazi next took a flight to Kuwait, his homeland, to live with his fiancee’s family. He took a job in IT and remained there for eight months until deciding to visit his family in London in may 2010. By now, the Emwazis were living in a ground floor council flat on the edge of the notorious Mozart Estate, north of the Harrow Road in West London, a warren of red brick blocks and towers built in the 1970s. Residents there were wary of the Emwazi. Elisa Moraise, a neighbour, said: “I haven’t seen the young man for years but he was strange and unfriendly, he never said hello. My son is a similar age and they were never friends.”
Emwazi was detained at Heathrow but allowed on his way and spent eight days in the UK before returning to Kuwait. In July 2010, he flew back to London, his engagement having ended but a new fiancee found. He was detained again but this time the questioning was far more intense. Again his claims give a clue to his increasing radicalisation and defiance. “During the process of answering these questions and many more, one random officer wearing an Indian turban entered, and started also searching through my bags. He reached out for the Holy Quran and put it on the floor and I asked him to put it onto the chair rather than on the floor.
“He started to get aggressive, changing his tone of voice. He said ‘I’ve put it onto the chair now, so just shut up’ and I replied ‘You shut up’. He stood up aggressively and came into my face, pushing me back onto the chair. At that point I told the other officers that I was not going to answer any-more questions until this aggressive and angry person, that had hate for me for no reason, got out of the room.”
By now, security services convinced of his terrorist ambitions prevented him leaving the UK, putting him on a terror watch list that prevented his travel to Kuwait and should have stopped him going to Syria. Emwazi complained to Mr Qureshi: “I feel like a prisoner, only not in a Cage, in London. A person imprisoned and controlled by security service men, stopping me from living my new life in my birthplace & country, Kuwait.” His second engagement inevitably also was doomed to fail.
Links to other terrorists
Court documents seen by The Telegraph show how the Government clearly did not believe Emwazi’s claims of innocence. The documents, used in a court case against another terrorist, show how Emwazi was by 2012 believed to be part of an established network of local extremists, referred to sometimes as the “The London Boys” and all well-known to the security services. A number have since gone to fight jihad in Syria, and at least one killed. But in 2012, according to the legal document, they were part of “a network of United Kingdom and East African-based Islamist extremists which is involved in the provision of funds and equipment to Somalia for terrorism-related purposes and the facilitation of individuals’ travel from the United Kingdom to Somalia to undertake terrorism-related activity”.
That legal document names Emwazi as a danger to society but also connects him in with Bilal al-Berjawi, who grew up less than a mile from Emwazi. Al-Berjawi became a senior leader of al-Shabaab and was subsequently killed in a US drone attack in January 2012.
The court papers also connect him to four men known as “The London Boys”, who lived in the same area of west London. A mile from Emwazi’s family home also lived two Somalis who on July 21 2005 tried to blow up the London Underground in a repeat of the 7/7 attacks two weeks earlier. Although still a teenager at the time, it is likely security services will also investigate connections between Emwazi and those men, all supporters of al-Shabaab.
Another notorious figure from Ladbroke Grove is Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary, a former rapper who posted an infamous Tweet showing him holding a severed head in Syria, alongside the words ‘Chillin’ with my other homie, or what’s left of him”. Such was his bloodthirstiness that until recently, he was considered likely to be the man behind Jihadi John’s black mask. The coincidence makes it likely Bary and Emwazi know each other well.
The route to Syria
By January 2012, Emwazi was looking at ways of evading the security services and the scrutiny he was being put under. He was barred from returning to Kuwait and in evidence of his increasing desperation changed his name in early 2013 by deed poll to Mohammed al-Ayan on the advice of his father, who wanted his son to start a fresh life free of the authorities in Kuwait. Emwazi tried again under his new name to reach Kuwait and, according to Cage, “with one final roll of the dice… bought a ticket for Kuwait…. Once again he was frustrated as he was barred from travel, and once again questioned by the security agencies”.
Three weeks later, he vanished.
His parents according to Cage become concerned at his disappearance and reported him as a ‘missing person’. Four months after that – presumably in the late spring or early summer of 2013 – police officers visited Mr and Mrs Emwazi at home and told him their son was in Syria.
How he got there will form part of the investigation into his activities and into his wider network. It is likely he entered via Turkey although a flight there should have been flagged up just as it had to Kuwait. How he became such an instrumental player so quickly in the Islamic State’s hierarchy is shrouded in mystery. It is thought he first surfaced at a prison in Idlib in Syria, where Western hostages were already being held. A former hostage, one of a handful freed after negotiations and who escaped Jihadi John’s brutality, said that the Briton was part of the team guarding them. A former hostage said Emwazi had taken particular relish in the “waterboarding” of four Western hostages. “He was the most deliberate” said the former hostage. In early 2014, the hostages accompanied by Emwazi were moved to Raqqa, the Islamic State’s stronghold in Syria. The Washington Post claimed yesterday that by that stage Emwazi and two other men with British accents, including one called ‘George’ had “taken on more powerful roles within the Islamic State”. Emwazi earned the monicker Jihadi John in the media because the group were given the names of the Beatles as nicknames.
The hunt for Jihadi John
Emwazi became the world’s most wanted man when on august 19 last year, the Islamic State released a video showing the beheading of James Foley, an American freelance journalist who had been kidnapped in November 2012. Speaking in what was clearly a British accent, he threatened Barack Obama with “the bloodshed of your people” unless he ended US airstrikes against Isil positions in Iraq.
Jihadi John then beheaded Mr Foley with a knife, and going on to carry out public beheadings of five other foreign hostages, the atrocities also recorded in videos used as Isil propaganda. His second victim was Steven Sotloff, another American freelance journalist. Two weeks later he murdered David Haines, a British aid worker. Hopes that a man helping civilian victims of the war might expect some mercy were dashed, as they were too in the case of Manchester’s Alan Henning, a taxi driver who had gone on an aid mission with Muslim friends.
The next beheading video featured Peter Kassig, a former US soldier who was again an aid worker, this time despite even pleas for clemency from a senior al-Qaeda militant, who said Mr Kassig had treated him for a wound he suffered in battle. That video also showed Jihadi John presiding over the mass beheadings of 21 Syrian soldiers.
As long ago as September, US and UK security services had declared they were certain they had identified Jihadi John. Reports surfaced that special forces had been despatched to Syria to seek out and destroy the hostages’ executioner.
But Emwazi’s name only emerged yesterday in an investigation by the Washington Post. Mr Qureshi had confirmed the similarities but the newspaper drew on other sources as well. “I have no doubt that Mohammed is Jihadi John,” one of Emwazi’s friends told the newspaper, “He was like a brother to me… I am sure it is him.”
The hunt continues for him. Last night, David Haines’ teenage daughter Bethany Haines told ITV News that unmasking Emwazi was only the beginning. She was critical of the border agencies failure to stop jihadists such as Emwazi and in particular teenage girls from reaching Syria.
Asked what she thought of the security services knowing him, she said: , “It is shocking but they’re doing their job. They’re doing the best they can. They’e not dealt with a so-called Islamic State like this before. There’s no right or wrong.”
On the subject of the border agencies, she added: “There is, especially with the three girls that went over, there should been more security in airports to stop people doing that and definitely for him, obviously he’s part of a terrorist group and is out to kill hundreds of people and it’s not right.
“The fact they’re so young. One of them is a year younger than me. They’ve been brainwashed. And it’s not their fault but there should’ve been someone there stopping them.
“They need to be monitoring airports more clearly. They need to be asking more security questions. Why are people going to Turkey and then getting a connecting flight? It’s not right. You don’t just go to Syria on holiday.”
The subject turned to Emwazi and the revelation he is Jihadi John. Did it offer closure, she was asked. “It’s a good step,” she replied, “But I think all the families will feel closure and relief once there’s a bullet between his eyes.”
“Originally, in general film-making usage, the “money shot” was simply the scene that cost the most money to produce. In general, a money shot (also called a money-making shot) is a provocative, sensational, or memorable sequence in a film, on which the film’s commercial performance is perceived to depend. The scene may or may not be a special-effects sequence, but may be counted on to become a selling point for the film. For example, in an action thriller, an expensive special-effects sequence of a dam bursting might be considered the money shot of the film. Many filmmakers read a script and look for the most dramatic or climactic moment—the money shot—in the proposed film. Even though the costs or technical challenges of filming such an impressive scene may be huge, producers and directors will do whatever it takes to get that shot completed. It is because of its box-office importance and expensive set-up, that this climactic scene is often referred to as a money shot.”
“OOOI Data refers to times of the actual aircraft movements of Gate Out, Wheels Off, Wheels On, and Gate In. This data is provided for many carriers on a next day basis from ARINC, a private aviation communications company, and on a monthly basis from DOT’s ASQP Data. In addition, starting October 1, 2012, CountOps Threshold Crossing Times, which are within seconds of the Wheels Off and Wheels On times, are used to populate the Wheels Off and Wheels On times on a next day basis when no ARINC OOOI data are available. CountOps is an automated source of departure and arrival counts for Operations Network (OPSNET).
These actual aircraft movement times are the basis for many statistics throughout ASPM. When OOOI times are not available, they are estimated. For more information on estimation techniques, see ASPM: Estimation Techniques.
Most OOOI times are detected and transmitted automatically by sensors (such as doors, parking brakes, and strut switch sensors) in ACARS-equipped aircraft. On and Off times from CountOps Threshold Crossing Times are based on radar hits on take-off or landing. The table below explains the action and condition related to each OOOI time from ACARS-equipped aircraft.
“[Evidence of Serco’s – then RCA GB 29 – deployment of Long Range Desert Group Navigators in WWII] On September 13th, 1940, a quarter of a million Italian troops under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani crossed the Libyan-Egyptian border and started an attack on the British troops in Egypt. Their objective: to push through the weak British defences and reach the Suez Canal, thus threatening one of the Empire’s most vital links with its overseas colonies. The outcome of the war might well have been different had the Italian troops succeeded in their campaign – however, just as the attack began, Graziani began receiving disturbing news of attacks on his supply chains: depots were raided, airfields burned to the ground, convoys attacked and captured, all well behind the frontline and from a direction he had thought to be completely safe – his southern flank, bordered by a sand sea thought to be impassible for vehicles and troops. The Italian offense halted, Graziani being uncertain how to deal with these unsuspected attacks that seemed to come out of nowhere, and the resulting break gave the British defenders all the time they needed to move in reinforcements and mount a counterattack.
Unknown to Graziani, these raids were not carried out by large troop contingents but by a small group of desert experts formed only six weeks before – the Long Range Desert Group, at the time consisting of no more than a couple dozen men and a handful of re-fitted civilian trucks. This bold movement that was to tip the scales in the Allies’ favor in one of the most decisive moments of the war was made possible by the vision of two men – General Sir Archibald Wavell, head of the British Middle East troops, who had masterminded this effective bluff, and Major Ralph Bagnold, a World War 1 Veteran who had spent the interwar years as a desert explorer and had a knowledge of the Libyan desert unmatched in his time.
As the Italian offense drew near, Bagnold had quickly contacted his pre-war explorer buddies and -on Wavell’s command- started to assemble a unit that could quickly move through desert terrain and strike at the enemy where he least expected it, using lightly armed and completely un-armored vehicles and operating completely self-sufficient, patrols being able to move through the desert for at least two weeks before resupplying.
During the course of the African Campaign, the unit conducted various raids on Axis targets far behind enemy lines, thus constantly threatening the Axis’ interior lines of communication and aggravating Rommel’s already precarious supply situation. Of equally great importance was LRDG’s intelligence work – patrols could supply HQ with detailed information on number, speed and direction of enemy troop movement, giving Allied operations a tactical edge that considerably helped fasten the defeat of Rommel’s Afrika Korps. When in the battle of Alam Halfa Rommel’s deputy, Wilhelm von Thoma, was captured, he was surprised to hear that Montgomery was better informed on German troop strengths and movements than he himself – information Montgomery had largely obtained from LRDG patrols.
Just as the LRDG had won the day in the beginning of the African war, they also triggered the end of the campaign: in 1943, when General Freyberg attacked Rommel’s last stand at Mareth, he moved his troops through “impassable” terrain to attack the Germans’ weak southern flank, using a route an LRDG patrol had scouted out for him.”
“Government plans to use Flight 93 cockpit tapes in Moussaoui trial “Additional recordings would be played from the cockpit of an executive jet that tracked Flight 93 on Sept. 11” “An official for NetJets, a company that sells shares in private business aircraft, confirmed that the plane tracking Flight 93 belonged to the company. The official, who asked not to be identified by name, said the company was asked not to comment on the Sept. 11 flight but would not say who made the request.” Finally someone admits that there was a plane up there when Flight 93 crashed. But who was it and why?“
“Nothing could be further from the truth. The truth is that a considerable portion of the global banking system is explicitly dedicated to handling the enormous volume of cash produced daily by dope traffickers.”
Great Game India said that contrary to popular opinion, “it is not ‘demand’ from the world’s population which creates the mind destroying drug trade.”
“Rather, it is the world financial oligarchy, looking for massive profits and the destruction of the minds of the population it is determined to dominate, which organized the drug trade. The case of HSBC underscores that point. Serving as the central bank of this global apparatus, is HSBC.”
Great Game India traced HSBC back to the 1890s when British intelligence agents operating the drug trade in the Opium Wars launched the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation “as a repository for their opium proceeds.”
‘A criminal organization’
Cruz began working at HSBC on Jan. 14, 2008, as a commercial bank accounts relationship manager, and was terminated for “poor job performance” on Feb. 17, 2010, after he refused to stop investigating the HSBC criminal money-laundering scheme from within the bank.
Cruz worked in the HSBC southern New York region, which accounts for approximately 50 percent of HSBC’s North American revenue. He was assigned to work with several branch managers to identify accounts to which HSBC might introduce additional banking services.
Cruz told WND he recorded hundreds of hours of meetings he conducted with HSBC management and bank security personnel in which he charged various bank managers were engaging in criminal acts.
“I have hours and hours of recordings, ranging from bank tellers, to business representatives, to branch managers, to executives,” he said. “The whole system is designed to be a culture of fraud to make it look like it’s a legal system. But it’s not.”
Cruz explained that after many repeated efforts, he gave up on the idea that HSBC senior management or bank security would pursue his allegations to investigate and stop the wrongdoing.
“My conclusion was that HSBC wasn’t going to do anything about this account, because HSBC management from the branch level, to senior bank security, to executive senior management was involved in the illegal activity I found,” he said.
Despite repeated attempts to bring the information to the attention of law enforcement officers, Cruz hit a brick wall until WND examined his documentation and determined his allegations were sufficiently substantiated to merit publication.
“HSBC is a criminal organization,” Cruz stressed. “It is a culture of crime.”
“OAT / NETJETS EUROPE CADET PROGRAMME
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
OAT offers a bespoke HSBC loan programme for all APP FO students. Based on this programme, OAT/NetJets Europe cadets will qualify for a loan of up to £60,000, subject to meeting agreed HSBC/NetJets requirements. The loan will be paid off through salary deductions over a period of 5 to 6 years.
Successful candidates will be required to deposit £9,000 into a HSBC deposit account prior to commencement of the course, which will be refunded to their loan account, plus interest, once they have successfully completed their multi-engine commercial flight test (approximately 50 weeks into the course).”
Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) is considering plans to allow 30- or 40 percent more business aviation traffic at the Royal Air Force’s London-area Northolt base. At the same time, newly formed Northolt Business Aviation is preparing to offer unused air force hangar space to corporate operators.
The MoD is now contemplating an application to increase annual civil movements permitted at the airfield from 7,000 to 9,000 or 10,000. The basis for the increase, which has been requested by civil operators and service companies active at the airfield, is that the number of military movements at the site has declined since 10 years ago, when the current limit was set. The airport is located just 12 mi west of London, about three miles north of Heathrow Airport and close to the M25 beltway.
Local politicians and residents have been steadfastly opposed to increased civil traffic at Northolt. This opposition is being countered by the argument that modern business aircraft are significantly quieter than the military transports that have used the airfield.
Rising demand for RAF Northolt as an alternative business aviation gateway to the UK capital cannot be met by current limits, with controllers having to ration slots so as not to exceed the 7,000-movement annual quota. Operators have complained that this rationing is handled in a somewhat irrational, bureaucratic way, rather than acknowledging that business aviation traffic tends to be lighter in the vacation months of July and August and allowing the movements to be spread more evenly over the busier months. At press time the annual slots quota for 2002 had been almost exhausted, forcing some operators to use alternatives such as Farnborough.
The RAF station commander at Northolt is actively encouraged by the MoD to generate commercial revenue from the base by using “irreducible spare capacity.” Crucially, he cannot increase the deployment of RAF personnel specifically to provide for civil operations. With the number of military operations progressively decreasing, this spare capacity is necessarily increasing. That said, with a possible war with Iraq looming it remains to be seen whether this might delay any plans to allow a larger civil aviation presence at the strategically located airfield.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned Northolt Business Aviation, established two years ago by Peter Riley, former director of flight operations for UK media group Granada, has leased Northolt’s Hangar 311 from the UK government’s Defence Estates agency and has signed a deal that enables NetJets Europe to use the building as its forward operating base. As of early last month, the fractional provider has been operating some of its 38-aircraft fleet out of Northolt to take advantage of its proximity to central London. By July, the NetJets Europe fleet is set to rise to 60 aircraft.
Riley, a former RAF fighter pilot, told AIN that the NetJets activity should not constrain other business aviation flying at Northolt because the aircraft will rotate through the airfield as necessary, rather than being permanently based there. In fact, the total number of NetJets movements in and out of Northolt should probably decrease because the operator has previously had to resort to a lot of positioning flights to and from other London-area airports. By being nominally based at Northolt, it will benefit from preferential access to weekend slots and to the more economical civil aircraft fuel supply provided by Air BP.
NetJets is establishing its own JAR 145 maintenance operation at the base to support its own aircraft. Its overall European operation will continue to be managed from its headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal.
The Granada flight department had itself been based at Northolt until it was mothballed six months ago. The company is now trying to sell its 1987 Hawker 800.
Maintenance for other based and transient civil aircraft is available from Serco, which is bidding to provide support for the NetJets operations at Northolt. The JAR 145-certified operation already provides support for the two BAE 146s and six Hawkers operated by the Royal Air Force to transport members of Britain’s royal family, as well as government ministers and officials. This operation falls under the auspices of the RAF’s No. 32 (The Royal) Squadron, which was formed from the 1997 amalgamation of the Queen’s Flight (then based at RAF Benson) and 32 Squadron’s government flight department.
The MoD is planning to build a new hangar next to the Northolt operations building, which doubles as a terminal for business aviation. The new building would mainly house The Royal Squadron’s aircraft, but will offer additional capacity for corporate operators.
Separately, the RAF is evaluating possible replacement aircraft for the 146s and Hawkers. Options being considered include the Gulfstream V and Bombardier Global Express, both of which could provide significantly greater range than is possible with the existing fleet.
Ground handling for business aircraft is provided by Northolt Handling, a joint venture between Regional Airports (owner of London-area Biggin Hill and Southend Airports) and Serco under a four-year license that started in July 2001. It will provide handling for the NetJets aircraft and already provides other visiting operators with ad hoc covered aircraft parking in Northolt’s Hangars 5 and 6.
Slots at Northolt are available strictly by prior arrangement, with the official deadline for requests being 3:30 p.m. on the preceding day. In some instances, Northolt Handling is able to secure slots on somewhat shorter notice since it works with the RAF controllers on flight planning for civil movements.
Northolt Handling manager Robert Walters told AIN that the average number of movements each day is around 30, a number that peaked as high as 50 during busy periods last year. The FBO now has almost 150 regular customers.
The airfield’s official opening hours for civil flights are 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekdays. Based operators can sometimes get permission for flights outside these hours and on weekends, provided the airfield is open for military operations at the time. When a slot is not available, Northolt Handling tries to redirect flights to its sister airports at Biggin Hill (12 mi southeast of London) and Southend (37 mi to the east and open 24/7).
Northolt’s main runway is 5,525 ft long, which allows larger business jets such as the Falcon 900 to take off fully loaded. Larger aircraft such as the Boeing Business Jet can also use the airfield, but are limited by pavement-strength issues to around a dozen movements per year.
Landing fees go directly to the RAF and are among the most costly in the London area. A GIV operator, for example, would pay around £1,100 ($1,700). RAF Northolt currently collects almost $2 million in civil landing fees annually and is ranked as one of Britain’s most commercially viable air force bases.
Handling fees are charged in the following four mtow categories: £90 ($140) for up to 10 metric tons (22,046 lb); £120 ($186) for between 10 and 20 metric tons (up to 44,092 lb); £150 ($233) for between 20 and 40 metric tons (up to 88,184 lb); and £180 ($279) for aircraft over 40 metric tons. The Northolt landing fee covers use of a ground power unit and lavatory service for the aircraft. The handling fee covers all other ground services.
Northolt Handling currently has three staff members besides Walters, and it is about to add another. Supplementary baggage handling can be provided by RAF personnel during busy periods. In addition to Serco, which now manages the RAF’s visiting aircraft servicing operation, line maintenance and repairs can be conducted by Jet Aviation, which dispatches mechanics from its Biggin Hill operation.
Visiting aircraft generally have to purchase fuel from RAF supplies at somewhat elevated prices. For based aircraft, and by special arrangement, fuel can be supplied by Air BP.”
“Brian J Walton Aviation Engineer & Expert Witness
1995 to date … Serco Group plc, RAF Northolt
Senior BAe 146 Crew Chief
Operate under The Military Aviation Authority (MAA) & Maintenance Approved Organisation Scheme (MAOS) rules.
Fly on the BAe 146 CC2 of No32 (TR) Squadron, RAF (an amalgamation of The Queen’s Flight and 32 Squadron RAF) as a civilian Engineering Specialist. Duties include setting up the aircraft and testing all systems. Carry out all servicing and rectification and solely responsible for engineering standards whilst away from base. Fly worldwide on Royal/VVIP Tours, often for extended periods and was the engineer on all of HRH The Duke of Edinburgh’s BAe 146 tasks for approximately six years until his retirement from flying.
Responsible for training and annual assessment of all the new BAe 146 Crew Chiefs, ensuring they continue to meet exacting engineering standards. Accompany Test Pilots on full Air Tests on an annual basis and on any Air Checks. Carry out diagnosis, rectification and functionals of all systems, including ground running of the engines and APU, also take part in hangar servicing of the BAe 146 at all levels up to C check.
Completed all the manufacturers BAe 146 training courses, Airframe, Engine, Electrics, Avionic and SEP10 Autopilot course.”
Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222
David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891 Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation
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