#1888: Marine Links Serco Skynet to Boeing MI-3 Mycroft Whistleblowers, Chicago Obama Zigbee Extortion Nodes (COZEN)
Plum City – (AbelDanger.net). United States Marine Field McConnell has linked the Serco Skynet communications network to the Boeing whistleblowers’ attempting to expose agents deployed by Nicholas ‘Mycroft’ Soames through the Langham Hotel and the MI-3 Innholders Livery Company and Chicago’s Obama Zigbee extortion nodes built by Michelle and Barack Obama after the cozening, female (?) grifter had been forced to give up her Illinois law license in 1993.
McConnell recognizes Mycroft Warrants as writs issued by a competent but blackmailed or extorted officer, usually a judge or magistrate, who permits otherwise illegal acts (spoliation of evidence; spread betting on body-bag counts at crime-scene investigations; bypassing autopsies to conceal murder-for-hire and the placement of blackmailed pedophiles in decoy triage teams) and affords the person executing the writ protection from damages if the act is performed.
MI-3 = Kristine Marcy (sister) + Norman Inkster + Interpol + Intrepid (William Stephenson)
McConnell claims Serco root companies extorted then Prince of Wales (Bullingdon alumnus, later Edward VII) to issue Mycroft warrants to a telegraph-betting center in London’s Langham Hotel – an alleged pedophile honeypot used to blackmail MI-3 guests and give them script kiddie roles in perfectly-synchronized Zigbee assassination and triage teams
McConnell notes that while Serco’s pedophile blackmailers may have controlled hotel crime scenes and bookmaking frauds since 1888, MI-3 founder William “Intrepid” Stephenson made the first use of BBC wireless photo transmissions to blackmail Langham habitués who may have included a Bullingdon alumnus, the late and treasonous Duke of Windsor, and the late Winston Churchill – a compulsive but losing gambler and the grandfather of the new Serco Chief Executive Officer Rupert Soames and his BBC Mycroft role-playing brother Nicholas Soames.
McConnell claims that after the 1979-1995 Unabomb campaign, Baginski and Soames, a former personal assistant to the late chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Mark Hatfield, procured Serco Skynet clocks for a MI-3 Chicago hotel base in 2001 so that the Obamas’ ZigBee agents could disrupt first responders and synchronize the spoliation of evidence on 9/11.
McConnell believes Privy Councillor Soames – former Defence Minister under the Langham Hotel habitué John Major and a skilled practitioner of MI-3 Mycroft Qui tam frauds (cf. Serco tags, FAA Contract Towers, Skynet Wi-Fi, USPTO, Obamacare) – ordered Baginski to stage a hijack in which the real MH370 was landed in China while ZigBee agents pinged Inmarsat, fed a sting to the BBC, stole Freescale timing devices and prepared for a phony Doomsday search.
McConnell invites key word Googlers to read excerpts below and ask why “The List of Sherlock Innholders – The Wrist That Didn’t Bleed” book has a new title at https://abeldanger.blogspot.com/
#1886: Marine Links MI-3 Mycroft’s Serco ZigBee Sting to the MH370 Inmarsat Pings
Malaysian Airlines aircraft hijacked, say investigators
The Sting (9/10) Movie CLIP – You’re a Gutless Cheat (1973) HD
Real Time Location System based on Zigbee
Strange meeting – Sherlock – BBC
“Definition of COZEN ….. 1: to deceive, win over, or induce to do something by artful coaxing and wheedling or shrewd trickery … 2: to gain by cozening someone — coz·en·er noun”
“Grifter …. A grifter is someone who swindles you through deception or fraud. Synonyms include fraudster, con artist, cheater, confidence man, scammer, hustler, swindler, etc. 1) That grifter swindled me out of £250,000! 2) “The first rule of grifting is, you can’t cheat an honest man.” -Quote from the BBC show “Hustle.”
“Malaysia Airlines: The pilots of the missing plane; involved in ‘deliberate action?’
By Ben Brumfield and Pamela Brown, CNN
updated 10:43 AM EDT, Sat March 15, 2014
CNN) — “All right, good night.”
Those are the last words heard from the cockpit of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, said Zulazri Mohd Ahnuar, Malaysian civil aviation officer.
Who said them? Was it the captain or his first mate? Or someone else in the cockpit with them?
Since MH 370 went missing Saturday, there have been more questions than answers, including about the pilots.
Malaysian investigators are refocusing their attention on the passengers and crew. They now believe that the plane’s diversion was a matter of deliberate action by someone onboard.
Information from international and Malaysian officials indicate that the Boeing 777-200ER passenger jet may have flown for more than seven hours after last contact with the pilots.
The duty of all pilots is to aviate, navigate and communicate, in that order, an aviation expert has told CNN.
Someone may have kept aviating, but either they couldn’t — or wouldn’t — communicate.
This is what we know about the 53-year-old pilot captain and his 27-year-old first mate.
Capt. Zaharie Ahmad Shah
Police have been outside his Malaysia home every day since the plane vanished, a source told CNN. But they have not gone inside.
If they did, they might find a flight simulator there. In a YouTube video he apparently posted, Zaharie can be seen sitting in front of one.
And in a German online forum for simulator enthusiasts, X-Sim.de, there is a post from November 2012 in his name that says he built it himself.
“About a month ago I finish assembly of FSX and FS9 with 6 monitors.” The message was signed Capt. Zaharie Ahmad Shah BOEING 777 MALAYSIA AIRLINES.
FSX and FS9 are over-the-counter flight simulator games made by Microsoft.
On Friday, the CEO of Malaysia Airlines said that everyone is allowed to pursue their hobbies.
Zaharie, a pilot with 18,365 flight hours under his belt, is reportedly also a flight instructor.
On the same YouTube channel, Zaharie gives workman’s tips on tinkering with a refrigerator and an air conditioner.
CNN cannot verify the authenticity of the social media posts.
1st Officer Fariq Ab Hamid
CNN’s aviation correspondent Richard Quest once visited MH 370’s 1st Officer Fariq Ab Hamid in a Malaysia Airlines cockpit, when he was training. Quest watched him land the plane under supervision of a senior pilot in February.
The captain described Fariq’s landing as textbook perfect.
Fariq joined Malaysia Airlines in 2007. He has 2,763 flying hours behind him and was transitioning to the
Boeing 777-200 after finishing training in a flight simulator.
As with Zaharie, not much is known to the public about Fariq. But Quest was not the only guest who had joined him in the cockpit.
Passenger Jonti Roos got an invitation to check out the cockpit during a flight from Thailand to Malaysia — one that Fariq was flying with another pilot.
She took photos and said Farid and his colleague smoked in the cockpit. After MH 370’s disappearance, she reported her experience to journalists.
Malaysia Airlines was aghast. “We are shocked by these allegations,” the airline said.
Such a practice would be illegal on U.S. carriers after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, but not necessarily so on international ones, Quest said.
Exploring the possibilities
Does Roos’ story open up the possibility that a third or fourth person could have joined Zaharie and Fariq in the cockpit?
Like most everything surrounding flight MH 370, that’s yet unknown. But someone apparently did something.
Not long after the flight took off from Kuala Lumpur and the voice signed off, communications systems were disabled, and the plane’s transponder was turned off, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said Saturday.
That last device is situated between the pilots and can be shut off with a twist of the wrist. For a pilot to turn it off would seem reckless because the information it transmits gives the plane vital protection. It helps people on the ground locate the plane.
Someone would have to know how to do it and also know the plane would lose that protection.
And the apparent lack of visibility on radar? “Airline pilots are not trained for radar avoidance,” said aviation expert Keith Wolzinger, a former 777 pilot. They like to stay on the radar, because — again — it protects their plane.
Only military pilots, he said, are usually keen on avoiding radar.
The father of a passenger on the missing plane is hoping for an outcome that would sound shocking under normal circumstances.
“I hope the plane was hijacked, because then, at least, there is hope,” Li from Hebei Province said. He did not give his full name.
Li is waiting at a Beijing hotel with dozens of other passengers’ family members awaiting word on the fate of their loved ones.
“But if the worst happened then I will have no meaning in my life. This is my only son,” Li said.
As he walked away, he bent his head and cried.
READ: Missing Malaysia airliner: Questions and answers
READ: Transponder’s fate may prove key to solving Malaysia Airlines puzzle
MAPS: What happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight 370?
CNN’s Pauline Chiou contributed from Beijing” Bombshell: The Real Reason Barack Obama And Michele Lost Their Law License. Thursday, June 21, 2012 4:25
BY David Herold
I am reposting for those who have missed it.
I knew they had both lost their law license, but I didn’t know why until I read this.
This is 100% legit. I check it out at https://www.iardc.org/ Stands for Illinois Attorney Registration And Disciplinary Committee. It’s the official arm of lawyer discipline in Illinois ; and they are very strict. (Talk about irony.) Even I, at the advanced age of almost 65, maintain (at the cost of approximately $600/year) my law license that I worked so hard and long to earn.
Former Constitutional Law Lecturer and U.S. President Makes Up Constitutional Quotes During State Of The Union (SOTU) Address.
1. President Barack Obama, former editor of the Harvard Law Review, is no longer a “lawyer”. He surrendered his license back in 2008 in order to escape charges he lied on his bar application. A “Voluntary Surrender” is not something where you decide “Gee, a license is not really something I need anymore, is it?” and forget to renew your license. No, a “Voluntary Surrender” is something you do when you’ve been accused of something, and you ‘voluntarily surrender” your license five seconds before the state suspends you.
2 Michelle Obama “voluntarily surrendered” her law license in 1993. after a Federal Judge gave her the choice between surrendering her license or standing trial for Insurance fraud!
3. Facts.Source: http://jdlong.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/pres-barack-obama-editor-of-the-Harvard-law-review-has-no-law-license/
4. A senior lecturer is one thing, a fully ranked law professor is another. Barack Obama was NOT a Constitutional Law Professor at the University of Chicago .
5. The University of Chicago released a statement in March 2008 saying Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) “served as a professor” in the law school-but that is a title Obama, who taught courses there part-time, never held, a spokesman for the school confirmed in 2008.
6. “He did not hold the title of Professor of Law,” said Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, an Assistant Dean for Communications and Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago School of Law.
7. The former Constitutional Senior Lecturer (Obama) cited the U.S. Constitution the other night during his State of the Union Address. Unfortunately, the quote he cited was from the Declaration of Independence … not the Constitution.
8. The B-Cast posted the video: http://www.breitbart.tv/did-obama-confuse-the-constitution-with-the-declaration-of-independence/
9. Free Republic : In the State of the Union Address, President Obama said: “We find unity in our incredible diversity, drawing on the promise enshrined in our Constitution: the notion that we are all created equal.
10. Um, wrong citing, wrong founding document there Champ, I mean Mr. President. By the way, the promises are not a notion, our founders named them unalienable rights. The document is our Declaration of Independence and it reads:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
11. And this is the same guy who lectured the Supreme Court moments later in the same speech?
When you are a phony it’s hard to keep facts straight. Keep this moving — educate others”
Boeing: What Really Happened
December 14, 2003
The really surprising thing about Philip M. Condit’s resignation as chairman and chief executive officer of Boeing Co. (BA) was not that his seven-year tenure ended so abruptly on Dec. 1, but that it lasted so long. Recent allegations of questionable conduct by a Boeing executive involved in negotiating an $18 billion deal with the Pentagon was only the latest mishap in a series of ethical lapses and managerial blunders that marred Condit’s tumultuous reign from the start.
Condit’s resignation has been portrayed as the selfless gesture of a leader who put the company’s interests before his own. In fact, Condit had survived an array of crises before this latest upheaval, and the chairman had no intention of bailing out this time, according to people who are close to the company. But with its crucial defense business in jeopardy, a board that had overlooked missteps before finally took firm action. The CEO had to go. Under pressure from the board, Condit offered his resignation. According to an old friend who talked to him on Monday night, the CEO was distraught. Condit and Boeing insist his exit was voluntary.
A BOLD VISIONARY
The story of Philip Murray Condit, 62, is the tale of a manager promoted beyond his competence and blind to his own shortcomings. The skills that made him a brilliant engineer — obsessive problem solving and an ability to envision elegant design solutions — were of less use in an executive position. Although always a bold visionary, Condit was frequently indecisive and isolated as a CEO — in stark contrast to his predecessors. Starting with founder William Boeing, the company has been led by a succession of strong, commanding leaders who enjoyed near-total autonomy, displayed unwavering devotion to a culture of engineering and manufacturing excellence, and led modest personal lives. Condit may have enjoyed a similar degree of latitude, but he was further removed from the company’s operations. He also developed a reputation as a womanizer, often with Boeing employees, and an appetite for the high life. In a hiatus between one of his four marriages, Condit took up residence in the Boeing suite at Seattle’s Four Seasons Olympic Hotel, where he had the suite remodeled at company expense to add a bedroom, say some people who are familiar with the matter.
His troubles started almost as soon as Condit moved into the CEO’s office. Within a year, he had steered Boeing into a manufacturing crisis that took Wall Street — and the board — by surprise and ultimately caused the company to take a $2.6 billion write-down. Last year, in a telling coda, Boeing paid $92.5 million to shareholders who accused the company of using accounting tricks to hide the damage prior to the crucial merger with McDonnell Douglas (BW — May 20, 2002). Even worse, through most of his tenure, Condit badly misread the rising threat from Europe’s Airbus. And some of the acquisitions he made to diversify away from commercial aircraft were plagued with integration problems. This year alone, Boeing has taken more than $1 billion in deal-related write-offs. Company officials point out that “in the midst of the worst downturn in the history of commercial aviation,” Boeing is profitable in all its businesses. However, revenues have been declining since 2001 and will slip to an estimated $49 billion this year with estimated earnings of $790 million. The result: Boeing’s stock has fallen 6.5% under Condit — while the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index rose 61.8%. “That was a difficult record to run away from,” says Richard Turgeon, research director of Victory Capital Management, which owns 2 million Boeing shares. “It was unacceptable.”
CLOSE TO THE EDGE
Equally damning was the heavy damage done to Boeing’s reputation on Condit’s watch. A company that had long been a paragon of American industrial excellence has ensnared itself in one scandal after another in recent years. “Under Condit, engineering skills and ethics seemed to lose sway over senior management,” says Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va. “Condit booked a huge amount of defense business by allowing his subordinates to play business close to the edge.” Boeing has said that there is no evidence linking Condit to the scandals.
The decision to steer the company more deeply into defense contracting represented a historic shift. The most crucial step in that process was the 1997 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas. Not only did that deal make defense contracting a much bigger part of Boeing’s mix but the smaller McDonnell also had an outsize effect on the Boeing culture. Boeing, the jewel of its hometown of Seattle, had always prided itself on treating employees — from designers to line workers — as family. But the values most esteemed at McDonnell were the ability to schmooze with Washington power brokers and win the contract. Building planes sometimes seemed to take second place.
And with McDonnell came a new No. 2 exec, Harry C. Stonecipher. The decisive, brutally candid Stonecipher was the temperamental opposite of the aloof, nonconfrontational Condit. Many inside the company came to view him as an enforcer. The relentless bottom-line focus Stonecipher brought to bear during his stint as president antagonized many managers on the Boeing side of the house. Condit’s [allegedly-extorted] 2001 decision to move the company headquarters to Chicago [allegedly to set up MitM ZigBee 9/11 attack] completed the cultural uprooting, leaving many of those left behind in Seattle feeling a bit like unloved stepchildren.
Condit had been steeped in the Boeing culture for more than 30 years. He caught the eye of Boeing’s top brass almost as soon as he arrived at the company in 1965, fresh out of Princeton with a master’s degree in aeronautics. Early in his career, he solved a vexing problem by calculating the force of the vortex created when jumbo jets take off. This allowed the Federal Aviation Administration to develop rules for safe spacing between jumbos and smaller aircraft, rules still in effect today. It was that problem-solving skill that attracted the attention of Thornton A. “T” Wilson, then Boeing’s chairman and CEO, who took the engineer under his wing. “It was clear that young Condit was a standout engineer and person,” recalls Granville Frazier, a retired Boeing senior exec and longtime friend who first met Condit in the mid-1960s.
Later, Condit’s design leadership on the 757 and 777 programs positioned him to take over the top job. But although he won great praise for his engineering prowess, some say both programs were riddled with problems that resulted from poor management. On the 777, for example, Condit made some inspired design breakthroughs, most notably switching to software that allowed Boeing to go directly from a design on the computer screen to the factory floor, avoiding expensive mockups. But Condit wildly overshot his initial budget. The plane was budgeted for $6 billion in development costs but ultimately cost $12 billion, say close observers. “We were milking money from the 767 and the 737, and that money was going right into the 777,” said one former high-ranking Boeing exec. “Even though it’s a wonderful machine, on a stand-alone basis, the 777 is not a commercial success.” Boeing declined to discuss development costs, saying they are proprietary.
Once he reached the top spot, Condit’s shortcomings as a manager became more worrisome. Within a year of taking office, Condit overreached in trying to step up airliner production even as the company was shifting to a more automated manufacturing system — the equivalent of replacing the engine on a race car as it wheels around the track at 200 mph. Boeing’s massive Seattle assembly lines nearly broke down in 1997, a year after he assumed office. By the time order was restored, the company had lost most of its credibility on Wall Street — a humiliation that seared the new CEO. In a meeting on Aug. 5 of that year — with more than two dozen senior execs in the board room of Boeing’s then- headquarters in Seattle — Condit complained about the embarrassment he had suffered while trying to soothe angry investors on the East Coast, recall execs present at the meeting. He had been called a liar by shareholders fed up with broken promises, the production fiasco, and a slumping stock. With tears welling, Condit vowed he would never suffer such indignity again. In a talk this year to plant workers, Condit took responsibility for the stumble, saying: “I give myself a very poor grade. It happened, and so it’s my responsibility. There’s my F.”
THE FALL GUY
But Condit’s problems were far from over. By the spring of 1998, with earnings struggling, global markets in a nosedive, and the stock under pressure, investors were calling for Condit’s head and pressuring directors to do something. Condit saved his own position, but others were not so lucky. On a Saturday in early September, he called Ron Woodard, then president of the commercial airplane division, and asked him to come to the office. Condit told Woodard this hurts me more than it hurts you — and fired him. Woodard became the fall guy for the manufacturing collapse. “He told me he had a real close brush with the board, and he was almost dumped two months before,” Woodard told BusinessWeek.
But if there was any lingering sense of shame, it didn’t deter Condit from his taste for lavish living. In the early ’90s, he built a massive medieval-style mansion outside Seattle, replete with a custom miniature train that chugged from room to room, delivering drinks to guests. Condit hosted elaborate parties that often included poetry readings and evenings of Camelot themes, featuring characters from King Arthur.
That extravagance soon began filtering into a company culture that had been based on modesty, fiscal restraint, and the singleminded pursuit of building big airplanes. Former CEOs Bill Allen and T. Wilson both eschewed the trappings of corporate privilege. Wilson lived in the same middle-class house during his whole career at Boeing. When Condit succeeded Frank Shrontz as CEO in 1996, Boeing had three small corporate jets, and senior execs were required to fly commercial airlines to stay in touch with their customers. Now, Boeing has a fleet of corporate jets, including a 737 for Condit, done up in English-library style.
Condit’s personal life was similarly prone to excess, and it began to raise eyebrows within the company and among directors. After his second marriage, to a Boeing secretary, broke up in 1990, Condit embarked on a relationship with a Boeing receptionist, Laverne Hawthorne. They dated for about six months — until Condit got promoted to president in 1992. About the same time, the company’s customer relations department downsized, and Hawthorne was issued a pink slip. She told BusinessWeek that she immediately went to see him in his office and reminded him of promises he had made to her. As Hawthorne recalls it, she looked him in the eye and said: “One of us in this room has balls, and it certainly isn’t you.” Then she stormed out. Hawthorne declines to say whether she filed a wrongful-termination suit against Condit or received a settlement from the company, but several Boeing executives say both happened. “There was a lawsuit and a settlement,” said one Boeing exec. Condit declined to comment.
As Condit’s airplane factories were imploding in 1997, so was his third marriage. That’s when he moved into the suite at the Four Seasons. Condit had married Jan Condit — his first cousin — in the early ’90s. The two divorced in 1998, and their file is sealed in the King County Superior Court in Seattle. Jan Condit now lives in the mansion.
As Condit rose through the ranks, his private life became more of an issue within the company. Former Boeing Chairman Shrontz had long been concerned and had confronted Condit several times about his personal relationships, say people in the know. Shrontz declined to comment. Former Boeing director Charles M. Piggott, retired chairman of Paccar Inc., had expressed concern to several senior Boeing executives about Condit’s behavior. Piggott did not return calls seeking comment. Said one Boeing lawyer to a senior Boeing executive: “We have another Bill Clinton on our hands. [Grifter Bill]”
SEALED COURT FILES
Boeing has other woes relating to women. A class action alleging widespread pay discrimination against women is now pending in federal court in Seattle. The suit alleges that top company officials knowingly underpaid women and denied them promotion to “enrich the corporation” at their expense, says plaintiffs’ lawyer Mike Helgren. Boeing says that allegations are without merit. The documents in this suit have been sealed by the court. BusinessWeek has asked to have them unsealed. That motion is pending.
Although Condit often trumpeted his visionary strategic skills, they failed him when it counted most. As late as 1996, in a meeting with Boeing’s legendary European salesman, Rudy Hillinga, Condit assured him that Airbus would never launch the A380 program. According to Hillinga, Condit said: “I’ll give you my personal guarantee, that this time around, Airbus will not succeed.” Condit not only underestimated the Airbus threat but also waffled when he needed to respond decisively. Under Condit, Boeing first proposed the 747x, a supersized 747, and then later the Sonic Cruiser, a high-speed jetliner.
Despite the marketing hype and strong suggestions that Boeing would launch both jetliner programs, Condit did not pull the lever. While Airbus got bigger, Boeing stagnated. The failure to formulate a strategy that could keep up with an emboldened Airbus began to tell as Boeing fell behind in both technology and manufacturing efficiency during the ’90s. Boeing, once the manufacturing marvel of the world, now spent 10% to 20% more than Airbus to build a plane. The loss in market share — from nearly 70% in 1996 to roughly 50% today — has marked an astonishing reversal. Boeing believes that smaller planes and direct flights will prevail against Airbus’ A380 jumbo jet, and says it’s focusing on profits, “not market share at any cost.” But while Airbus is well under way with the A380, Boeing has still not committed to its latest proposal: the superefficient 7E7 jetliner. The company says it will make a decision on whether to go forward by the end of the year. Condit recently told employees: “I would not trade strategies for any amount of money.”
Partly to deal with the cyclical nature of the airline business and the rise of Airbus, Condit took steps to diversify his company. Boeing started gobbling up big and small aerospace and information-service outfits. Condit gets high marks for the McDonnell Douglas acquisition. Although the clash in company cultures raised serious management challenges, it let Boeing expand in defense as its commercial business waned. Defense-related sales now account for more than half of the company’s revenues, making Boeing the nation’s No. 2 defense contractor.
But as Condit got the acquisition bug, some of his forays failed to bear fruit. In late 1999, Boeing bought Hughes Electronics Corp.’s (GMH) Space & Communications Div. for $3.75 billion and later paid $1.5 billion for Tribune Co.’s Jeppesen-Sanderson Inc., the world’s largest provider of flight maps and other services for pilots. Boeing hoped to capture more of the higher-margin services businesses and expand Hughes’s fledgling satellite services business. Many investors at the time supported Boeing’s belief that space, in particular, represented a huge growth opportunity and would add more balance to the volatile commercial airplane business.
But Condit later admitted that he was wrong. He told Everett (Wash.) employees this summer that the space market “did not turn out to be what we thought it was going to be, and we didn’t perform.” The $1.1 billion charge was the latest in a series of write-offs related to a collapsing space market as well as to serious quality and manufacturing problems dogging the former Hughes satellites. Boeing officials are still trying to turn it around. “I’ll be the first to admit that the commercial space business was a dry hole,” Jim Albaugh, CEO of Boeing’s integrated defense systems unit, told BusinessWeek. “But we are in good company, and a lot of good people had the same aspirations and had the same problems.”
But if strategic blunders and failures to execute can be overlooked by a board, scandal can’t be. Not when you’re a defense contractor. A snowballing ethics problem threatened to imperil the side of Boeing’s business that was still growing and healthy: its lucrative government contracts. In the end, that’s what did Condit in. The intense scrutiny of Boeing’s misconduct is just heating up. On Dec. 2, the Pentagon postponed action on the $18 billion Air Force deal to acquire 100 Boeing 767 tankers, pending an investigation into the actions that led Boeing to sack Chief Financial Officer Michael Sears and manager Darleen A. Druyun for ethics violations. The Justice Dept., two investigative branches of the Defense Dept., and the Senate Armed Services Committee are investigating allegations that Boeing acted improperly, or even criminally, in an effort to win at least two multibillion-dollar aerospace defense contracts. A second scandal, dating from 1998, involved the possession of 35,000 pages of Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) documents during the 1998 competition for a military rocket-launch contract. The Pentagon has indefinitely suspended Boeing from bidding on future rocket contracts pending a review of its ethics. Lockheed Martin is also suing Boeing over the alleged document theft.
Condit was not personally implicated in either of this year’s Air Force scandals. But the recent fusillade of embarrassments was too much even for Boeing’s famously forgiving board of directors, which had been paying out rope to Condit for years. After Condit resigned, the board awarded the CEO title to one of their own, Stonecipher, 67, who had served for five years as Condit’s No. 2 after Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas. At the same time, the board named director Lewis E. Platt, the former chairman of Hewlett-Packard Co. (HPQ), to the new post of nonexecutive chairman.
Stonecipher’s mettle will immediately be tested by a momentous decision. By Dec. 15, the board is expected to decide whether to commit to the development of the 7E7 jetliner, which would be Boeing’s first new airplane in a decade. The decision will say much about Boeing’s commitment to the commercial airplane market. “This is really a pivotal moment,” says Richard L. Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst at Teal Group Corp. consultants. “Failure to invest in the 7E7 could mean the beginning of the end for Boeing’s storied airplane business.”
To many, the ascent of Stonecipher represents the de facto takeover of Boeing by McDonnell Douglas. Condit’s most enduring contribution to Boeing’s history may be ensuring the transformation of Boeing into a defense contractor with a commercial aviation subsidiary — an ironic legacy for a brilliant aviation engineer. By Stanley Holmes.”
“Serco Inc. is the outfit chosen by the City of Chicago’s Department of Revenue to wander the streets dishing out tickets for parking/permit infractions. Over the past few years I feel that I have personally done my part to significantly raise the value of Serco’s stock. The trouble with these ticket-wielding vigilantes is that they are unreasonable. If you are ever parked on a metered street in lakeview, be sure to keep your eye on the clock. These cats stroll the avenues and are attracted to the blinking red lights of expired parking meters, like flies to, well, you know! I am not a fan of this Serco, Inc. I shouldn’t hate the people who are giving me the tickets, but I do. I feel like these people would be doing our fine city a better duty by cleaning it, promoting non-violence, I dunno just about anything other than making my life more difficult.”
Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222
David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891 Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation