McConnell claims that Serco root companies extorted then Prince of Wales (later Edward VII) to issue Mycroft warrants to a telegraph-betting center in London’s Langham Hotel – now an alleged MI-3 pedophile honeypot used to recruit blackmailed guests and Zigbee assassins.
McConnell notes that while Serco’s pedophile blackmailers may have controlled hotel crime scenes and bookmaking frauds since 1888, MI-3 founder William “Intrepid” Stephenson made the first use of wireless photo transmissions to blackmail Langham habitués who may have included the late Winston Churchill – compulsive story-boarding gambler and grandfather of the new Serco CEO Rupert Soames and his BBC Mycroft role-playing brother Nicholas Soames.
McConnell claims that after the 1979-1995 Unabomb campaign, Nicholas Soames, a former personal assistant to the late and former chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield, had Serco hire Maureen Baginski out of NSA and FBI Intelligence to equip the BBC with Freescale patent devices for the Zigbee decoy and drone maneuvers of 9/11.
McConnell believes that Privy Councillor Soames, a former U.K. Defence Minister under the Langham Hotel habitué John Major and a skilled practitioner of MI-3 Mycroft Qui tam frauds (cf. Serco tags, FAA Contract Towers, Skynet Wi-Fi, USPTO), ordered Baginski to stage a Zigbee hijack in which the real MH370 landed in China so the Freescale passengers could be abducted, patent devices stolen and decoys prepped to be found later by Serco’s phony search.
“NeverVotedBush writes with news reported by CNN that a passenger manifest for the flight that went missing on its way from Malaysia to China indicates that “Twenty of the passengers aboard the flight work with Freescale Semiconductor, a [Zigbee development] company based in Austin, Texas. The company said that 12 of the employees are from Malaysia and eight are from China,” and writes “Apparently, at least two passengers used stolen passports to board.””
“Chinese Should Know Cameron Was a ‘Hong’ The PM’s trip to China reminds Guido that he has a little factoid that he hasn’t seen anywhere else, namely that during Dave’s 1985 gap year he worked for Jardine Matheson, before going up to Oxford. Young Cameron worked for three months in Hong Kong as a ‘ship jumper’ for Jardine Shipping Agencies. Dave was responsible for attending to ships when they called at Hong Kong. His tasks ranged from taking care of all the formalities with the customs and immigration authorities, to looking after travel and personal arrangements for crew members. Did his time in Hong Kong teach him to work hard and invest wisely – or did it encourage him to squander his salary in the bars of Wan Chai? Guido can confirm that there are many exciting diversions for a young man in Hong Kong…
The political relevance of this is that Jardine Matheson is one of the original Hong Kong trading houses or “Hongs” and Jardine Matheson’s early profits were based on selling opium to the Chinese. When the Chinese emperor tried to ban the trade, the company called on Britain to intervene, leading to the 1839 Opium War. This is not viewed well in China, something to be borne in mind when the former lackey of the oppressors is lecturing them about human rights…”
“Freescale offers a portfolio of low-power, cost-effective wireless solutions for embedded devices. These solutions address a number of monitoring and control applications, including consumer, smart energy, industrial and health care. Freescale provides solutions for sub-1 GHz and 2.4 GHz bands, including IEEE® 802.15.4 and ZigBee® protocol stacks. Freescale’s one-stop-shop is complete with development tools, reference designs and software, designed to help ease wireless development and speed time to market.”
“Use Cases for Smart Grid Security Standards
December 7th, 2012
Meera Balakrishnan, Freescale Semiconductor
Governments around the world have recognized the existing vulnerability and need to protect the grid infrastructure. With efforts from organizations such as NERC and NIST, the specific requirements for increased grid security have been well-defined.
Need for Improved Grid Security
Attacks on computer systems from viruses, root kits, Trojans, worms, keyloggers, bots and other malicious software have been the focus of hackers and cyber-security experts for many years. With historically isolated industrial controls such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) connected to the same networks, loss of service as well as physical damage can be caused from unauthorized access. In fact, the goal of the smart grid is network connectivity, so network security is fundamental to its successful implementation.
However, the global electricity grid infrastructure has experienced a rapid increase in the number of vulnerabilities since 2000 and the occurrences are growing. As one of the key assets of any nation, protection from the increasing number of attempted and successful attacks on the grid and its metering systems is (or should be) a national priority for all industrialized countries.
Increasingly, more dangerous attacks have occurred from a variety of sophisticated attackers, including foreign governments. Attackers include state-run and financed attacks, hackers, cyber terrorists, organized crime, industrial competitors, disgruntled employees and careless or poorly trained employees. Perhaps the most well-known recent occurrence was the Stuxnet computer worm. Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet was spread through Microsoft Windows OS targeting Siemens’ SCADA systems.
The motivation for stakeholders from content owners, service providers and manufacturers to end users varies as shown in Table 1. The bottom line is the cost impact that can be significant. At the 2011 London Conference on Cyberspace, British Prime Minister, David Cameron reported that cybercrime cost the UK an estimated 27B pounds a year, and with several other nations as much as US$1Trillion a year globally.
As a result, governments around the world have taken steps to provide increased security and reduce the cost of cybercrime. U.S. government organizations active in standards and other areas include the North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Designed to ensure the reliability of bulk electric systems in North America, NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) includes standards development, compliance enforcement, assessments of risk and preparedness. NIST developed and issued NISTIR 7628, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security and NIST Special Publication 1108: NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0.
Standards Developed to Provide Improved Grid Security
NERC’s CIP Reliability Standards require compliance with specific requirements to safeguard critical cyber assets. CIP-002 through CIP-009 address physical as well as cyber-security requirements for responsible grid entities. They provide the benchmarks for utility companies’ measurements and certifications. Cyber aspects include:
Identifying critical assets
Identifying and training cyber-security personnel
Developing and implementing security management
Defining methods, processes and procedures
Securing the systems identified as critical cyber assets
Reporting and response planning
Establishing recovery plans
NIST’s cyber-security objective of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) impacts the interactions of several entities as shown in Figure 2. The basis of the interactions are the Internet, enterprise buses, wide area networks (WANs), substation local area networks (LANs), field area networks and premises networks. While confidentiality is least critical for power system reliability, it is increasingly important with the availability of online customer information and privacy laws that impose strict penalties for breach of privacy. The integrity for power system operation addresses requirements of:
Authentication of the data,
No modification of the data without authorization
Implementation of NISTIR 7628
Known and authenticated time stamping and quality of data
In addition to establishing the requirements, NIST existing and developed standards identify critical security aspects such as data encryption and definitions for common understanding and implementation of solutions.
Root of Trust and Other Definitions
The fundamental step towards establishing a secure or trusted component or entry point to a network is a root of trust (RoT). The RoT verifies that the component is performing in an expected manner in the initial operation or engagement of the component or system. This established trust provides the first step towards improving security. In the Aberdeen Group report, “Endpoint Security: Hardware Roots of Trust,” the analyst notes that over a twelve-month period, companies that utilized a hardware root of trust in their approach to security had 50% fewer security related incidents and 47% fewer compliance/audit deficiencies.
Two use cases exemplify the implementation of NIST requirements.
Use Case 1: Smart Meters
Smart meters or the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) have two-way communications between field-area networks in the smart grid. As such, they can be a weak link in overall network security. In the NERC CIP assessment, critical smart meter areas are:
15 – Interface between systems that use customer site networks such as home area networks (HANs) and building area networks (BANs)
17 – Interface between systems and mobile field crew laptops/equipment
18 – Interface between metering equipment
The NIST CIA impact level of low (L), medium (M) or high (H) for these critical areas is shown in Table 2.
User identification and authentication
Device identification and authentication
Security function isolation
Software and information integrity
To meet these requirements, the silicon solution must provide:
Random number generator (RNG)
Trusted execution/hardware firewall
AMI system functions include measuring, communicating and using the data. Encryption techniques are defined for specific aspects of these functions. Smart meter encryption techniques include Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) that are even more stringent than techniques used in the banking sector. NIST applies additional requirements for smart meters including unique credentials, a key management system (KMS) that supports an appropriate lifecycle of periodic rekeying and revocation and more. The successful implementation of smart meter security is based on a hardware root of trust.
Use Case 2: Data Concentrator
In the AMI architecture, a data concentrator collects meter information and data for transmission to the utility.
Mechanisms for the interface between the data collection system and the electricity meter (or a data concentrator and the electricity meter) include:
Authentication of all command messages
Encryption (AES 128) to ensure confidentiality of metering data using block ciphering and a unique symmetric encryption key for each meter
Message authentication for meter data integrity provided via AES Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) algorithms
Securing the Grid and More
Increased grid infrastructure networking requires increased grid security. With efforts from organizations such as NERC and NIST, the specific requirements for increased grid security have been well-defined. As a result, enabling technologies from many companies will ensure high security levels as smart-grid systems, including smart meters and data concentrators, are implemented.
Meera Balakrishnan is the global segment marketing manager for smart energy (smart grid and metering) & Embedded Board Solutions (EBS) segments at Freescale. She graduated from Swinburne University in Melbourne, Australia and has over 11 years of experience in the semiconductor industry having worked in applications engineering, NPI marketer, distribution channel sales & business development positions both in the field and factory. She is currently based in Munich. Share and Enjoy”
“Smashing [Zigbee] chaps
If he wants to dodge charges of elitism, says Ros Taylor, David Cameron’s choice of clubs is not his strong suit
If one thing could keep David Davis in the running this week, it is the lingering doubt among some Tory MPs that a man with a background as wilfully elitist as David Cameron’s can really modernise the party.
The fact that he went to Eton is not really the point. More disquieting, in the eyes of some, is that he chose to join the Bullingdon drinking club at Oxford and, later, White’s club. The latter is an all-male enclave with an atmosphere that is stultifying even by the standards of St James’s. (“No, I don’t do,” said Nicholas Soames, one of its members and a Cameron supporter, when I rang him to find out more about it, and the line went dead.)
In the Regency period, White’s used to be synonymous with gambling aristocrats: anecdotally, members would rather leave someone lying on the pavement outside than abandon the bets they had placed on whether he could get up again. Obviously, the club has changed. Ask a member of White’s or the slightly less exclusive Carlton Club why they join and you will hear a spirited defence of the right of men – and, for that matter, women – of any class to gather together in private and in the company they choose. Their club is near work; it offers them a bolthole from the pressures of office and home; the wine cellar is a bonus; one can meet a friend for supper there.
Cameron took a similar line in an interview with the Times last weekend. “The truth is my father was chairman and the only thing I really do there is, I go and have lunch with him. I don’t believe we have to have a country where you can’t have independent organisations deciding what they want to be.”
Fair enough. But White’s ancient reputation for a calculated brand of hedonism is actively pursued by members of the Bullingdon. It is a small club, with only around 20 members at any one time. It costs “an awful lot to join”, according to one student at Oxford. Non-Etonians are not necessarily barred from membership, but it helps to have attended the school.
Most Oxford drinking clubs “meet up in someone’s room and drink themselves stupid,” explains Roger Waite, a student at Lincoln College. Even the Claret Club for ex-Etonians tends to focus on the consumption of alcohol. The Bullingdon is subtly different. For a start, it maintains an extraordinary secrecy: most undergraduates have no idea who is a member. New applicants have their rooms ritually trashed and are then required to organise one of the club’s infamous jaunts.
The routine is fairly predictable. Members, wearing tailcoats, go out for a meal at a location outside Oxford. They smash up the bottles and some of the surroundings, and then attempt to pay off the barman. Sometimes this works. Occasionally, as it seems happened at the White Hart pub in Fyfield in December last year, it doesn’t.
Fourteen members of the society booked a room in the pub under a false name, stating in advance that they would not be eating any pudding. Once their main course was served, the undergraduates began to brawl, throwing bottles and food at each other and smashing a window as staff forced them out through the fire exit.
One of those present was Alexander Fellowes, a nephew of Princess Diana. He told the Oxford Student the event was not a Bullingdon club meeting, though the paper says he admitted as much to the White Hart’s landlord.
Oxford Student magazine reported that the students were extremely polite to the serving staff and, as well as paying the bill in full, offered £500 in damages – £100 of which was accepted. Fellowes tipped the waitresses £200 each.
“Even when I pulled them off each other when they were fighting and chucking bottles at the walls, they would say ‘Sorry old chap, just a bit of high spirits’,” said the landlord, Ian Rogers.
Four of the diners were fined £80 for criminal damage and issued with a fixed penalty notice.
Waite says the damage to the pub was subsequently calculated at £492 – curiously, just short of the £500 which would have attracted a higher penalty. He adds that the police refused to release the names of the students who were fined.
The Bullingdon’s unusual spin on the concept of noblesse oblige occasionally extends to other kinds of violence. “I’ve heard that they will smash up a car in a car park and leave a cheque behind,” says Waite. The creative approach to destruction parodied by Evelyn Waugh in Decline and Fall – in the novel, members of the “Bollinger Club” bring a fox in a cage and stone it to death with champagne bottles – is nowadays lacking, as are the attacks on bookish fellow students. Nowadays, the Bullingdon is careful to pay its way out of trouble and stay well away from university premises.
What Cameron got up to when he was a member, and how committed he was to the Bullingdon’s peculiar brand of debauchery, is unclear. The most journalists have dug up so far is that he was once seen boarding a bus on the way to a Bullingdon jaunt in the company of Boris Johnson. Interestingly, smoking cannabis is not really the done thing among members. Presumably marijuana weakens the impulse to smash things up [Windows on the World?]. But for the sake of their alumnus, the current members of the club might want to keep an even lower profile in the months and years to come – if, that is, they want to see an old Bullingdonian in Downing Street.”
Field McConnell, United States Naval Academy, 1971; Forensic Economist; 30 year airline and 22 year military pilot; 23,000 hours of safety; Tel: 715 307 8222
David Hawkins Tel: 604 542-0891
Forensic Economist; former leader of oil-well blow-out teams; now sponsors Grand Juries in CSI Crime and Safety Investigation