Plum City – (AbelDanger.net). United States Marine Field McConnell has linked an alleged mutiny on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower during a half-life overhaul by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (just before the Northrop Grumman takeover in late 2001) to a Serco-directed SNAP-Gap bombing attack on the Pentagon during the phony 9/11 continuity-of-government exercise which appears to have killed a number of Eisenhower sailors who had refused to join the mutineers.
“Eisenhower Farewell Address — Military Industrial Complex”
Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Departs for Deployment
U.S. sailors aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) honor Sailors who died in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States in an undisclosed location Sept. 11, 2012. Dwight D. Eisenhower was deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, theater security cooperation efforts and support missions as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ryan D. McLearnon/Released)
Serco SNAP Gap bombing attack on Pentagon – allegedly designed to kill Ike sailors who refused to join mutineers – apparently used Pine Gap date and GLONASS (St. Petersberg time stamp 8 hours after 9:37 impact!)
“Northrop Bids $2.1 Billion for Newport News Defense: Offer for military shipbuilder seeks to undercut rival General Dynamics’ merger plans [developed by Obama mentor Lester Crown].May 09, 2001|PETER PAE | TIMES STAFF WRITER Northrop Grumman Corp., in an audacious move to undercut General Dynamics Corp.’s bid to become the nation’s largest military shipbuilder, launched a rival unsolicited offer Tuesday to acquire Newport News Shipbuilding Inc. Sparking what is expected to be an intense fight with its old archrival, Century City-based Northrop made a formal $2.1-billion offer for the Newport News, Va., ship maker.”
“TeleCommunication Systems, Inc., Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin have developed highly affordable satellite terminals for protected communications on the move and at the halt. This Low Cost Terminal (LCT) solution addresses the military’s need for lower cost technologies and systems to enable protected and secure communications for tactical warfighters in contested environments and areas of denied communications. Developed entirely with internal company investments, the LCTs include two classes of equipment: a Protected Communications On The Move (P-COTM) terminal and a Protected SIPR/NIPR Access Point (P-SNAP) terminal [Allegedly for Serco SNAP Gap MitM attacks on America]”
“2000s Deploying in February 2000 and returning that August on the “Millennium Cruise”, for the first time Ike’s embarked aircraft dropped ordnance in combat while supporting Operation Southern Watch‘s No-Fly Zone over Iraq [where Ike officers allegedly developed EW decoy and drone tactics to ensure that the US Air Force was stood down on 9/11 to allow Sky Warrior bombing attack on Pentagon’s U.S. Navy Command Center and the murder of rebels and whistleblowers] . On 21 May 2001, the ship returned to Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNS&DDC) to begin a 4 year, $2.5 billion refueling and complex overhaul. In addition to replacing the cores in the two nuclear reactors, Eisenhower underwent complex renovations and major technological upgrades during this scheduled half-life overhaul. On 25 January 2005, Ike left NNS&DDC under tow, and returned to Norfolk Naval Station, and the fleet. The modernizations are expected to extend the ship’s service life well beyond 2025.”
“[An interesting Christian SNAP Gapper on The Ike who may had motive, opportunity and weapon to set up Serco for the Stratum Zero attack on the Pentagon]
David Collins, CISSP
System Security Engineer (SSE) / IA at Northrop Grumman
September 2010 – Present (2 years 8 months) Colorado Springs, CO
Currently the Information Assurance (IA) Lead for an Army program operating a moderately sized Closed WAN. Responsible for the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) of these mission systems. Engineering lead for Information Security (INFOSEC) planning and design.
Produced, reviewed, and analyzed for validity; network descriptive and C&A products (documents) under DIACAP, DITSCAP, and NISCAP using DoD 8500/5200 series, DCID 6/3, and JDCSISSS IA Controls. Involved heavily in the SIBRS High Ground Segment ITC DITSCAP phase 2/3 accreditation efforts. Preformed the duties of an Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) for an NSA system. Acted as a Certification Authority (CA) Representative, reviewing network infrastructure of a world-wide system for IA competence, recommending changes to both program office and senior CA Representative. Produced documentation for C&A efforts under both DIACAP and NISCAP. Aided in the construction of DIACAP artifacts; redacted and completed several NISCAP System Security Policies (SSPs). Performed System Testing in accordance with the Security Requirements Traceability Matrix (SRTM) Developed Communication Security (COMSEC) policies and recommended COMSEC device/software configurations for highly classified system and lower level systems. Reviewed and edited IA Security Concept of Operations (SECONOPS) Created, reviewed and redacted many C&A supporting documentation items.
TASC, Inc.is now an independent company. TASC had always been a wholly owned subsidiary within Northrop Grumman, until we were sold on Dec. 19, 2009.
As a SSE, some of my duties include system / network testing, risk analysis, C&A work to include, DITSCAP, DIACAP, and NISCAP, validating systems against DoD 8500 and DCID 6/3 IA controls/requirements.
Produced, reviewed, and analyzed for validity; network descriptive and C&A products (documents) under DIACAP, DITSCAP, and NISCAP using DoD 8500/5200 series, DCID 6/3, and JDCSISSS IA Controls.
Involved heavily in the SIBRS High Ground Segment ITC DITSCAP phase 2/3 accreditation efforts.
Preformed the duties of an Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) for an NSA system.
Acted as a Certification Authority (CA) Representative, reviewing network infrastructure of a world-wide system for IA competence, recommending changes to both program office and senior CA Representative.
Produced documentation for C&A efforts under both DIACAP and NISCAP.
Aided in the construction of DIACAP artifacts; redacted and completed several NISCAP System Security Policies (SSPs).
Performed System Testing in accordance with the Security Requirements Traceability Matrix (SRTM) Developed Communication Security (COMSEC) policies and recommended COMSEC device/software configurations for highly classified system and lower level systems.
Reviewed and edited IA Security Concept of Operations (SECONOPS) Created, reviewed and redacted many C&A supporting documentation items.
Responsible for IS security posture across MS Windows 2003/2000/NT, HP-UX, SUN Solaris, and LINUX; Cisco – IOS and configuration management, ACL maintenance, Managing routing/router protocols Unclassified Trusted Network (UTN) Protect Policy compliance. (4 years); Responsible for DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) drafting, processing, and executing. (1 year)
Researched, proposed, obtained funding for, fielded bids and completed a SUN Solaris multi-screen, 50+ station SUNRay thin client network with secure server application access. Routed GIG waivers; initiated and completed NIPRNET, and SIPRNET accreditation Phase I / II / III approval process. Familiar with DISA Ports & Protocols and other STIGs. (1 year)
Responsible for maintaining a SUN Solaris/Windows 2000 SIPRNET data analyst infrastructure. Coordinated and monitored data feeds from external sources; managing Firewall rules to maintain proper connectivity and IS security. Resident subject-matter expert (SME) and responsible for training and managing personnel, proficient on all levels, in support of system operation on all UNIX based, classified systems: SUN, Oracle, GCCS-M, Gale-Lite, EJTAT, and FAS. (3 years)
Responsible for the support and facilitation of hardware/software, network system applications. Developed various technical design & implementation of interfaces, scripts, & production infrastructures to achieve optimum analytical tools and processes. (3 years)
I entered the Navy as an Electronic Warfare (EW), which was merged with CTT (Cryptologic Technician Technical in 200). I have been in the Information Operations (IO) realm my entire career. Whether that be Information Warfare (IW), Information Assurance (IA), or – a lot of times – both.
Overseer of Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA) / Information Assurance Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVB), and any IT issue, maintaining IS security posture throughout squadrons’ 22 networks.
Tracked and managed material and operational readiness for twelve (12) additional systems.
Maintained Information Assurance on all SIPRNET Windows, HP, LINUX, and networking units. (3 years) System Administrator for Command SIPRNET (Windows NT). Designed, planned, and executed upgrade the SWOS SIPRNET, installing two “Smart classrooms” with SIPRNET access. (3 years) Totally revamped the antiquated GCCS-M suite, bringing it into the 21st century, securing funding for the entire GCCS-M Lab and classroom upgrade. Managed Zircon chat, serving entire student body. (2 years)
Senior Administrator / Scenario designer for the Multi-platform Maritime Tactical Trainer (MMTT) UNIX based battle group simulation suite (UNIX based). (2 years) GCCS-M manager / administrator (3 years).
Provided classroom and hands-on training; Developed core instruction, media and test data bank for GCCS-M, Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO), and other courses. (3 years)
Provided instruction to more than 1100 officer (O-2 thru O-6) students in EW theory, practices, applications, system utilization, and GCCS-M theory/Labs, as well as all areas of Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Information (C4I). (3 years)
Appointed as the POIC for the EW watch team, responsible for the watch team’s correct identification, correlation, and dissemination of Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) data throughout the Eisenhower Battle Group (BG). Was lead on maintenance and repair of a IS support systems incorporated into the Electronic Warfare Arena.
Assisted the IS Department in UNIX and MS windows administration, including the Global Command and Control System – Maritime (GCCS-M), handling HP / SPARC / SIPR terminal configuration issues within the Combat Direction Center (CDC). (2 years) Leading Electronic Warfare Technician and Module Manager. Maintained material and operational readiness for four (4) vital, tactical war-fighting systems. (3 years) Assigned to Ship’s Security Division during a 19 month “Yard Period”. Was Brig Supervisor & Section Lead”